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better (or worse) off in some way at a particular time makes him better (or 
worse) off in some way in his life considered as a whole, and a person can be 
made better (or worse) off in some way in his life considered as a whole 
without being made better or worse off in some way at a particular time. 
In this paper, I will attempt to show that we should be whole-life welfarists. 
By focusing on lifetime, rather than momentary, well-being, a welfarist can 
solve two of the most vexing puzzles in value theory, The Badness of Death and 
The Problem of Additive Aggregation. 
 
2. The Badness of Death 
 
Many of us believe that one reason a person’s death can be a bad thing is that it 
can be bad for him (i.e., make him worse off in some way). But, at what time 
can one’s death possibly make one worse off? Not when one is alive, for then it 
hasn’t even happened yet. Equally, however, not when one is dead, for then one 
has no level of well-being to speak of. Call this the timing problem for the 
badness of death. 
Philosophers have offered two main kinds of responses to this problem. 
First, to try to show that one’s death can make one worse off at some time 
(temporalism). Second, to deny that something can make one worse off only if it 
makes one worse off at some time (atemporalism).  
In this section, I will argue that the two most promising versions of 
temporalism fail, and that atemporalism is viable, but only if whole-life 
welfarism is true. 
 
2.1 Temporalism 
 
Most temporalists are either priorists or subsequentists. According to priorism, 
one’s death can make one worse off when one is alive (and only then).1 It can do 
so, most priorists claim, by frustrating one’s present desires for future states of 
affairs. Suppose Eric wants to write a great novel, and would do so, but for his 
premature death. According to priorists, Eric’s death makes him worse off now 
by frustrating his desire to write this novel. 
Priorism faces two very serious worries. First, most of us find it highly 
counterintuitive to think that the frustration or satisfaction of one’s present 
desires for future states of affairs can affect how one is doing now. As David 
Velleman writes, 
 
We don’t say...of a person raised in adversity, that his youth wasn’t so 
bad, after all, simply because his youthful hopes were eventually fulfilled 
later in life. We might say that such a person’s adulthood compensated 
                                               
1 See Pitcher (1984), Feinberg (1993), and Luper (2004). 
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for an unfortunate youth; but we wouldn’t say that it made his youth any 
better.2 
 
Nobody, after all, would think to harm his enemy by frustrating (even very 
strong) desires this enemy once had, but has since lost. 
Second, even if it were true that the frustration of a present desire for a 
future state of affairs makes one worse off now, it seems impossible to account 
for the badness of death wholly in this way. Suppose Luna, had she not died last 
year, would have gone on to develop a deep and abiding interest in poetry, one 
she would have successfully pursued for years. In this case, Luna’s death seems 
a bad thing, in part, by depriving her of the opportunity to become interested in 
and pursue poetry, even if she’d had no desire during her lifetime that was 
frustrated by this deprivation. 
Let us move on, then, to subsequentism. Subsequentism says that one’s 
death can make one worse off when one is dead (and only then). According to 
the leading subsequentist, Ben Bradley, a person’s death makes her worse off at 
those times at which she “would have been living well, or living a life worth 
living, had she not died when she did”3. This is because, Bradley says, when one 
is dead, one has, at each moment, not no level of well-being, but a well-being 
level of zero. 
How can a person have a level of well-being of zero at a time at which he 
does not exist? Bradley responds by noting that one way a living person can 
have a zero level of well-being at a certain time is just for there to be nothing 
that is intrinsically good or bad for him at that time – i.e., just for him to lack 
certain properties.4 Now, says Bradley, “If there’s one thing non-existent objects 
are good at, it’s lacking properties”5. 
But is Bradley right that a living person for whom nothing is intrinsically 
good or bad at a certain time has a zero level of well-being at this time? I doubt 
it. Consider Rip, who, let us suppose, was extremely well off in both his 
childhood and his adulthood, but who had a very long period of 
unconsciousness in between, during which there was nothing that was either 
intrinsically good or bad for him at any time.6 If this period were made long 
enough, then, on Bradley’s view, Rip’s average level of well-being throughout 
his life would have to be extremely low. But this is counterintuitive, given Rip’s 
                                               
2 Velleman (1992), p. 340. See also Bradley: “[If] yesterday I desired that it not snow 
today, but it is snowing today, things were not going badly for me yesterday. If 
anything, they are going badly today” (2009), p. 87. For a contrary view, see Brucker 
(2013) and Dorsey (2013). 
3 Bradley (2009), p. 74. See also Feit (2002). 
4 The other way, Bradley says, is for the things that are intrinsically good for him at 
that time to perfectly balance the things that are intrinsically bad for him at that time. 
5 Bradley (2009), p. 106. 
6 Ignore problems of how Rip could be extremely well off at times after he has awoken 
given his separation from friends and loved ones. Suppose he is fascinated, rather than 
upset, by what has happened to him, and soon makes wonderful new friends (while 
cherishing the memory of his old ones). 
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extremely high level of well-being in both his childhood and his adulthood. 
Most of us feel as though Rip’s average well-being level was very high. If we 
are right, then, in calculating it, we must regard him as having had, during his 
unconscious years, not a zero well-being level, but no level at all. 
One’s level of well-being, I would suggest, is better understood using an 
analogy with the volume level of a sound. If you are listening to a sound on the 
radio, and then you turn the volume dial down to zero, you are left, not with a 
sound of zero volume, but with no sound at all. Similarly, if you take away 
everything that is intrinsically good or bad for a person at some time, this person 
is left, not with a well-being level of zero, but with no level of well-being at all. 
In both instances, there is nothing that remains for the relevant measure to be a 
measure of. 
The dead, then, cannot, as Bradley claims, have a zero level of well-being, 
just because nobody can. Subsequentism, then, cannot get off the ground. 
 
2.2 Atemporalism 
 
According to atemporalism, something can make one worse off without making 
one worse off at any time. How is this possible? Simply by reducing one’s 
lifetime well-being (i.e., making one worse off in some way in one’s life 
considered as a whole) without reducing one’s momentary well-being. To 
determine whether a person’s death was bad for him compared with some 
alternative possible death, one need only compare his actual lifetime well-being 
with the lifetime well-being he would have enjoyed on this alternative, and see 
which is higher. 
Atemporalism is available on each of the leading theories of lifetime well-
being. Consider, first, desire-based theories, on which lifetime well-being is 
equivalent to the extent to which one gets what one wants. There are two main 
desire-based theories, idealised life preferentism and desire satisfactionism.7 
According to idealised life preferentism, one life is better for a person than 
another just in case this person, having experienced each life from the inside, 
would prefer it (rather than the other) to have been his actual life.8 Desire 
satisfactionism, by contrast, says that one life is better for a person than another 
just in case it contains a greater balance of desire satisfaction over frustration 
than the other.9 On both these theories, death can reduce lifetime well-being 
without reducing momentary well-being. On idealised life preferentism, it can 
do so by resulting in a whole-life one would prefer less than the relevant 
alternative. On desire satisfactionism, it can do so by resulting in a whole-life 
that contains less desire satisfaction or more desire frustration than the relevant 
                                               
7 These are Chris Heathwood’s terms. For an excellent discussion of these views, see 
Heathwood (2011). 
8 This sort of view was first proposed by Henry Sidgwick in The Methods of Ethics 
(1907), pp. 111–112, and later advocated by John Rawls in A Theory of Justice (1971), 
pp. 92–93, p. 417. 
9 Heathwood (2011) himself is the leading advocate of this view. 
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alternative. 
Consider, next, achievementism, on which it is the fulfillment of one’s 
central goals or aims (rather than one’s desires) that determines one’s lifetime 
well-being.10 On achievementism, death can reduce one’s lifetime well-being 
without reducing one’s momentary well-being because it can result in a whole-
life involving less fulfillment of one’s central goals or aims.  
Consider, third, perfectionism, on which it is the fulfillment of one’s nature 
as the kind of creature (and perhaps also the individual) one is that determines 
one’s lifetime well-being.11 On perfectionism, death can reduce lifetime well-
being without reducing momentary well-being by resulting in a whole-life in 
which one does not as effectively fulfill one’s nature. 
Finally, consider hedonism, on which lifetime well-being is equivalent to 
the pleasurableness of one’s life minus its painfulness. On hedonism, death can 
reduce lifetime well-being without reducing momentary well-being by resulting 
in a whole-life that is less pleasurable or more painful in some way.12 
Atemporalism is an elegant and intuitive solution to the timing problem. 
However, as Bradley points out, it faces a serious worry. This is that it makes 
the reason for which death can be bad for its subject different in kind to the 
reason for which the vast majority of harms – harms such as sicknesses and 
injuries – are bad for their subjects. Sicknesses and injuries are bad for us 
because they make us worse off at particular times. Death should not be 
different. 
Why, you may be wondering, is this a problem? Death is, after all, in many 
ways unlike anything else. It is a problem because it makes it hard to see how 
we can have a unified axiology – i.e., an account of the goodness (and badness) 
of things on which good (and bad) things are good (and bad) for the same kind 
of reason – something that we need if we are to avoid difficult problems of 
commensurability. If sicknesses and injuries are bad things just because they 
make their subjects worse off at some time, and death is a bad thing just because 
it makes its subject worse off in his life considered as a whole (without making 
him worse off at any time), then it may be impossible to determine which is 
worse, a given injury or a given death. 
This is, indeed, a serious worry. A unified axiology is important to have. 
Fortunately, I believe, atemporalists can deliver one. They can do so by 
accepting what I have called whole-life welfarism. According to whole-life 
welfarism, something is bad only if it makes somebody worse off in some way 
in his life considered as a whole. Sicknesses and injuries, on any plausible 
theory of lifetime well-being, will often reduce their subject’s lifetime well-
being. On desire-based theories, they will do so when they result in a whole-life 
one would prefer less, or a whole-life containing less desire satisfaction or more 
desire frustration. On achievementism, they will do so when they result in a 
                                               
10 See Scanlon (1998) and Keller (2009). 
11 See Hurka (1993) and Kraut (2007). 
12 For the best recent defenses of hedonism, see Crisp (2006), Bradley (2009), and 
Feldman (2004).  
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whole-life involving less fulfillment of one’s central goals or aims. On 
perfectionism, they will do so when they result in a whole-life in which one 
does not as effectively fulfill one’s nature. On hedonism, they will do so when 
they result in a whole-life that is less pleasurable or more painful in some way. 
If whole-life welfarism is true, then sicknesses and injuries, while they 
certainly do make us worse off at particular times, are not bad things for this 
reason. They are bad things just when, and because, they reduce their subject’s 
(or somebody else’s) lifetime well-being.13 
Whole-life welfarism, then, removes the principal obstacle to accepting 
what is the most elegant and intuitive solution to the timing problem for the 
badness of death, atemporalism. 
 
3. The Problem of Additive Aggregation 
 
The second major puzzle in value theory that whole-life welfarism allows us to 
solve is what Larry Temkin calls the problem of additive aggregation. This 
puzzle is that some good things seem so good that even a small amount of them 
is better than any amount of certain other good things, and some bad things 
seem so bad that even a small amount of them is worse than any amount of 
certain other bad things. For example, it seems better that a single person is 
saved from a premature death than that any number of people enjoy a 
pleasurable lick from a lollipop. Similarly, it seems worse that an innocent 
person die prematurely than that any number of people suffer a short, mild 
headache.14 
Philosophers have offered two main kinds of responses to this puzzle.15 
First, to argue that there is some number of lollipop licks that would be better 
than the prevention of the death (as well as some number of short, mild 
headaches that would be worse than the death), and our intuitions about these 
cases are mistaken. Second, to try to explain how it could be the case that some 
good (or bad) things are so good (or bad) that even a small amount of them is 
better (or worse) than any amount of some other good (or bad) things.  
In this section, I will explain why neither of these responses is satisfactory. 
I will then defend a response made possible by whole-life welfarism: to deny 
that each lollipop lick is good (and each short, mild headache bad) at all. 
 
 
                                               
13 Note that it isn’t necessary, on whole-life welfarism, for something to be bad that it 
reduce a person’s lifetime well-being more than the relevant alternative. All that is 
necessary is that it make a person in some way worse off in his life considered as a 
whole. So, for example, if my getting the flu prevents me from boarding a plane that 
ends up crashing, it may still be the case (depending on the correct theory of lifetime 
well-being) that my getting the flu (owing, say, to its extreme unpleasantness) reduced 
my lifetime well-being in one way, and so was a bad thing in one way. 
14 The lollipop example is from Temkin (2012), p. 33. The headache example is found 
in many works in the literature. 
15 For other responses, and why they fail, see Dorsey (2009). 
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3.1 The First Response 
 
According to John Broome, there is some number of short, mild headaches that 
would be worse than the premature death of an innocent. While many of us find 
this counterintuitive, Broome argues that intuitions about very large numbers are 
unreliable.16 He writes 
 
Even the best philosophers cannot get an intuitive grasp of, say, tens of 
billions of people...[These] philosophers ought not to think their intuition 
can tell them the truths about such large numbers of people. For very 
large numbers, we have to rely on theory, not intuition.17 
 
He cites two kinds of cases where the involvement of very large numbers can 
mislead. First, in modern engineering, where “the cables that support 
suspension bridges are unintuitively slender”. Second, in evolutionary theory, 
where  
  
many people’s intuition tells them that the process of natural selection, 
however many billions of years it continued for, could not lead from 
primordial slime to creatures with intelligence and consciousness. Four 
billion years will do it.18 
 
Broome is right that, where large numbers are involved, intuitions can go 
wrong, and, moreover, that this is true not only in cases concerning what is 
physically possible (such as his engineering and evolution cases), but also in 
cases concerning the value of things. It seems likely, for example, that many of 
us do not fully appreciate how bad the Indonesian Boxing Day Tsunami of 
2004 was – it killed 280,000 people – owing to the sheer numbers involved. 
But whether we should think that our intuitions are mistaken in a given 
case concerning the value of things must depend, first, on how widely and 
firmly felt the intuition is, and, second, on the prospect of coming up with an 
acceptable theory that vindicates the intuition. For example, the intuition that 
torturing babies is wrong is so widely and firmly felt that we would be 
unjustified in believing any theory on which it is mistaken, if acceptable 
alternatives exist. 
For this reason, I think it is too soon to conclude with Broome that our 
intuitions are mistaken in the lollipops/headaches cases due to the involvement 
there of very large numbers. The intuition that there is no number of short, mild 
headaches that can be worse than the premature death of an innocent is 
extremely widely and firmly felt, and, as I will argue in Section 3.3, there exists 
an acceptable theory that can vindicate this intuition. 
 
                                               
16 See Broome (2004). See also Hare (1976). 
17 Broome (2004), p. 57. 
18 Broome (2004), p. 58. 
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3.2 The Second Response 
  
I want now to consider two attempts to explain how it could be that some good 
(or bad) things are so good (or bad) that even a small amount of them is better 
(or worse) than any amount of some other good (or bad) things. The best known 
such attempt is Derek Parfit’s, outlined in his paper “Overpopulation and the 
Quality of Life”19. Here, Parfit appeals to what he calls “the best things in life”. 
These things, which include “the best kinds of creative activity and aesthetic 
experience, the best relationships between different people, and the other things 
which do most to make life worth living”, have “more value…[or do] more to 
make the outcome better…than any amount of what is nearly as good”. Why is 
it better that an innocent person is saved from a premature death than that any 
number of people enjoy a pleasurable lick from a lollipop? It is because this 
person’s death might come at the cost of some of these best things, whereas the 
lollipop option would produce none of these things. 
There are a number of problems with Parfit’s proposal. I will mention just 
two. Consider, first, that, if it were right, some things would just miss out on 
being among “the best things in life”. Suppose Mozart’s music qualifies as one 
of them, but Haydn’s music narrowly misses out. It is implausible that even a 
small amount of Mozart is better than any amount of Haydn. As Parfit himself 
acknowledges, “it may be hard to defend the view that what is best has more 
value – or does more to make the outcome better – than any amount of what is 
nearly as good”. For this reason, he says, his view sometimes strikes even 
himself as “crazy”.20 
The second problem for Parfit’s response is that, even if it weren’t crazy, it 
wouldn’t explain very much. It says nothing, after all, about how it could be the 
case that the best things in life are so very valuable that even a small amount of 
them is better than any amount of any other good thing. To solve the puzzle, it 
would need to do so. 
The most sophisticated version of the second response is Dale Dorsey’s, 
made in his wonderful piece “Headaches, Lives, and Value”.21 Dorsey appeals, 
not to “the best things in life”, but to the notion of lifetime well-being, in order 
to explain how it could be the case that each lollipop lick is good, but no 
number of them better than the prevention of the premature death. According to 
Dorsey, while every “momentary hedonic good” (i.e., every pleasure 
considered independently of its consequences) increases its subject’s lifetime 
well-being, there is no number of such pleasures that can contribute as much to 
lifetime well-being (either of a single subject or to lifetime well-being across 
                                               
19 Parfit (2004), p. 18. 
20  It strikes many others as crazy, too. Stuart Rachels, for example, writes 
“Perfectionism entails that a brief taste of the best pleasure is better than a very long 
duration of pleasure very slightly less intense”. This, he says, is “wildly implausible”. 
Rachels (2001), p. 220. 
21  Dorsey (2009). For similar approaches, see Crisp (1992), Griffin (1977), and 
Portmore (1999). 
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lives) as anything that contributes even slightly to the fulfillment of a person’s 
global plans (i.e., the plans she would “endorse as valuable were she of sound 
mind and fully aware of all relevant information, including information about 
the consequences of her adopting [them]”). 
How can a premature death be worse than any number of short, mild 
headaches, even though each of the latter is bad? It is because the death can 
interfere with somebody’s global plans, and so result in a greater reduction in 
lifetime well-being than the headaches (which, Dorsey says, we must assume 
do not interfere with anyone’s global plans). The death is, in this way, more 
harmful to people, and so worse.22 
I believe Dorsey is on the right track in appealing to the notion of lifetime 
well-being in order to solve the puzzle. But his particular use of it will not do 
the job. This is because it merely relocates the puzzle from the area of value 
theory to that of lifetime well-being. Where the original puzzle was to explain 
how it could be the case that each short, mild headache is somewhat bad, but no 
amount of such headaches worse than a premature death, Dorsey leaves us 
wondering how it could be the case that each short, mild headache somewhat 
reduces a person’s lifetime well-being, but no amount of such headaches 
reduces people’s lifetime well-being more than something that interferes even 
slightly with somebody’s global plans. If every instance of a certain thing truly 
somewhat reduces a person’s lifetime well-being, then surely enough of that 
thing has got to reduce people’s lifetime well-being more than a finite amount 
of anything else that reduces somebody’s lifetime well-being. If not, why not? 
To solve the puzzle, Dorsey would need to answer this question. 
 
3.3 My Response 
 
While Dorsey’s response fails, it comes close to what I believe is the correct 
response to the puzzle. This is to hold 
 
(a) A thing is good (or bad) only if it increases (or decreases) a person’s 
lifetime well-being in some way (whole-life welfarism),  
 
(b) Each extra lollipop lick (and short, mild headache) (at least, as we are 
imagining it in these thought experiments) makes no difference to its 
subject’s lifetime well-being. 
 
Therefore, 
 
(c) Each extra lollipop lick is not a good thing (and each extra short, mild 
headache not a bad thing) at all. 
 
                                               
22 Dorsey’s solution appeals, in effect, to what I am calling whole-life welfarism. 
However, he neither distinguishes between welfarism in its whole-life and momentary 
forms, nor explicitly endorses the former.  
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Why is there no number of short, mild headaches that is worse than the 
premature death of an innocent? It is because each extra headache (at least, as 
we are imagining such headaches in this thought experiment), while it reduces 
its subject’s momentary well-being at the time of experience (i.e., makes him 
worse off then than he would otherwise have been), does not reduce his lifetime 
well-being at all, and so is not a bad thing at all. The premature death, by 
contrast, does reduce its subject’s lifetime well-being, and so is a bad thing.23 
We have seen above (in Section 2) why a premature death can reduce a 
person’s lifetime well-being. The crucial question is: Why doesn’t each extra 
short, mild headache reduce its subject’s lifetime well-being? I do not wish here 
to commit myself to a particular theory of lifetime well-being. Instead, I will 
suggest that on whichever of the leading theories of lifetime well-being one is 
inclined to accept, there is a case to be made that each extra headache does not 
reduce its subject’s lifetime well-being. 
Consider, first, idealised life preferentism. This theory, recall, says that one 
life is better for a person than another just in case this person, having 
experienced each life from the inside, would prefer it (rather than the other) to 
have been his actual life. It seems likely that, having experienced two lives from 
the inside that were identical but for the existence in one of an extra short, mild 
headache, most of us would have no preference between the two. In support of 
this claim, consider the well-known phenomenon that most of us are indifferent 
to past pains of ours that we have entirely recovered from (and that affect 
nothing else in our lives).24 
Of course, most of us are not indifferent to having had many such 
headaches (especially if these have affected other things in our lives). But my 
proposed solution to the problem of additive aggregation is consistent with a 
large number of short, mild headaches reducing a person’s lifetime well-being, 
and so being a bad thing. How many short, mild headaches in a single life does 
it take to reduce a person’s lifetime well-being, and so count as a bad thing? If 
idealised life preferentism is true, then it will depend just on the preferences of 
the individual in question. 
Consider, next, desire satisfactionism, on which one life is better for a 
person than another just in case it contains a greater balance of desire 
satisfaction over frustration than the other. If paired with a desire-based theory 
of pain, on which a painful experience is just a species of desire frustration 
                                               
23 The difference between Dorsey and myself is just that he holds, whereas I deny, that 
each short, mild headache reduces its subject’s lifetime well-being. 
24 See, for example, Parfit’s famous hospital case in Parfit (1984), p. 173, and also 
Charles Darwin in his Letters: “Many of my excursions on horseback through wild 
countries, or in the boats, some of which lasted several weeks, were deeply interesting; 
their discomfort and some degree of danger were at that time hardly a drawback, and 
none at all afterwards.” Darwin (1958), p. 30. (I am grateful to Brad Weslake for the 
Darwin reference.) Note also that it is important for this argument to go through that, 
according to idealised life preferentism, the preferences that are authoritative are not 
prospective – that we are choosing, not which life we are going to live, but which life 
was to have been ours. 
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(namely, frustration of an intrinsic desire for the experience not to be 
occurring 25 ) desire satisfactionism would entail that an extra short, mild 
headache necessarily reduces its subject’s lifetime well-being. However, if 
paired instead with a phenomenological theory of pain, on which an experience 
is painful just in case it involves a certain kind of phenomenology (or has a 
certain ‘feel’ to it)26, desire satisfactionism would not have this consequence. 
While desire-based theories of pleasure have been favoured by philosophers for 
years, their popularity is fading. This is partly because they cannot account for 
unpleasant experiences of which one is entirely unaware at the time of 
experience. One can hardly intrinsically want an experience of one’s not to be 
occurring, if one has no idea that it is occurring.27 Daniel Haybron offers the 
best examples of such experiences: 
 
Everyone knows that we often adapt to things over time: what was once 
pleasing now leaves no impression or seems tiresome, and what used to 
be highly irritating is now just another feature of the landscape. Could it 
also be that some things are lastingly pleasant or unpleasant, while our 
awareness of them fades? I would suggest that it can. Perhaps you have 
lived with a refrigerator that often whined due to a bad bearing. If so, 
you might have found that, with time, you entirely ceased to notice the 
racket. But occasionally, when the compressor stopped, you did notice 
the sudden, glorious silence. You might also have noted, first, a painful 
headache, and second, that you’d had no idea how obnoxious the noise 
was – or that it was occurring at all – until it ceased. But obnoxious it 
was, and all the while it had been, unbeknownst to you, fouling your 
experience as you went about your business. In short, you’d been having 
an unpleasant experience without knowing it. Moreover, you might well 
have remained unaware of the noise even when reflecting on whether 
you were enjoying yourself: the problem here is ignorance – call it 
reflective blindness – and not, as some have suggested, the familiar sort 
of inattentiveness we find when only peripherally aware of something. In 
such cases we can bring our attention to the experience easily and at will. 
Here the failure of attention is much deeper: we are so lacking in 
awareness that we can’t attend to the experience, at least not without 
prompting (as occurs when the noise suddenly changes).28 
 
If Haybron is right, then desire-based theories of pain have got to be mistaken, 
and so desire satisfactionism can allow that an extra short, mild headache does 
not reduce its subject’s lifetime well-being. 
Still, you may object, even if painful experiences are not constituted by 
desire frustration, most of us are averse to pains of ours while they are taking 
                                               
25 See Heathwood (2007). 
26 See Bramble (2013). 
27 See Bramble (2013). 
28 Haybron (2008). 
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place. Therefore, most short, mild headaches would, on desire satisfactionism, 
reduce their subject’s lifetime well-being.  
It is undeniable that most of us are averse to pains of ours while they are 
taking place. However, the most plausible version of desire satisfactionism, I 
believe, does not take as authoritative a person’s actual desires, but only those 
he would have were he suitably idealised (say, fully informed and vividly 
imagining). Now, it seems plausible that, when suitably idealised, most of us 
would not be averse to pains of ours that we know will be fleeting and not affect 
our lives in any other way.  
Consider T.E. Lawrence in the film Lawrence of Arabia. At one stage, 
Lawrence puts out a lit match with his bare fingers without flinching. 
Astonished, his comrade tries it for himself. “It damn well hurts”, he cries. 
“Certainly it hurts”, Lawrence replies. “Well, what’s the trick, then?” “The trick, 
William Potter, is not minding that it hurts.” Lawrence, it seems, through his 
scholarship, his wide experience of the world, and his profound acquaintance 
with human suffering – in short, just the sorts of things a desire satisfactionist 
should include as part of the idealisation process – has achieved indifference to 
pains like these. It seems plausible (or, at the very least, a possibility worth 
taking seriously) that most of us (even William Potter), if given the education, 
life experiences, and profound sensitivities of someone like Lawrence, would 
feel similarly toward our own short, mild pains. If this is true, then the most 
plausible version of desire satisfactionism would entail that an extra short, mild 
headache does not reduce its subject’s lifetime well-being. 
Even if, however, it is not true, the best form of desire satisfactionism may 
take as authoritative only one’s central (idealised) desires for how one’s life is 
to go. If this is the case, then desire satisfactionism would entail that an extra 
short, mild headache does not reduce its subject’s lifetime well-being, because 
such headaches, plausibly, would not interfere with the satisfaction of any such 
central desires. 
Consider, next, achievementism, on which it is the fulfillment of one’s 
central goals or aims (rather than one’s desires) that determines one’s lifetime 
well-being. If this theory is true, then an extra short, mild headache does not 
reduce its subject’s lifetime well-being, because such headaches do not interfere 
with the fulfillment of any of his central goals or aims. 
Consider, next, perfectionism, on which it is the fulfillment of one’s nature 
as the kind of creature (and individual) one is that determines one’s lifetime 
well-being. Once again, on this theory, it is plausible that an extra short, mild 
headache does not reduce its subject’s lifetime well-being, because such 
headaches would make no difference to whether he fulfills his nature. 
Finally, consider hedonism, on which lifetime well-being is equivalent to 
the pleasurableness of one’s life minus its painfulness. Prominent hedonists such 
as Bradley, Feldman, and Crisp hold that how pleasurable one’s life was 
considered as a whole is equivalent to the sum of pleasure contained within it, 
and so that every instance of pleasure necessarily increases its pleasurableness 
considered as a whole (and, in turn, one’s lifetime well-being). But a hedonist 
needn’t hold this view. Indeed, it strikes me as more plausible to say that the 
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addition of further instances of a given kind of pleasure to one’s life – providing 
these are truly phenomenologically identical (i.e., that there is nothing 
qualitatively new in them when it comes to pleasurableness) – may add nothing 
(in itself) to the pleasurableness of one’s life considered as a whole. 
Consider the following analogy with colours. When we ask how colourful a 
given thing is – say, a painting – most of us are wanting to know how many 
different colours it contains, and how bright these are. A very small painting 
consisting of many different bright colours (say, a miniature Blue Poles) may be 
far more colourful than a very large painting consisting of only one or two drab 
colours (say, Rothko’s Black on Maroon). However much you extend the latter, 
if it remains just the one or two drab colours, it will not become any more 
colourful. The same idea applies, I believe, to the overall pleasurableness of a 
life. What matters is just the variety of pleasure within it – i.e., the number of 
first instances of different kinds of pleasures – and the pleasurableness of these 
first instances.29 
If this is correct, then, even on hedonism, an extra pleasurable lollipop lick 
adds nothing to its subject’s lifetime well-being. Similarly, an extra short, mild 
headache (because it does not add to the unpleasurableness of its subject’s life 
considered as a whole) does not reduce its subject’s lifetime well-being. 
It may be objected: You rejected Broome’s response on account of its 
counterintuitiveness and the existence of an acceptable alternative. But the 
alternative you have sketched – i.e., that each extra lollipop lick is not good, and 
each extra short, mild headache not bad, at all – is surely equally 
counterintuitive. If there is one thing that most philosophers agree on, it’s that 
pleasure is intrinsically good, and pain intrinsically bad. 
While it is true that most philosophers agree on this, most philosophers 
have been wrong before, and it is hardly the dominant view in wider society. 
Many consider it a mark of maturity to come to regard certain minor pains (for 
example, pains due to cuts or scrapes), or the inconveniences associated with 
brushing one’s teeth at night, doing the dishes, etc., as not mattering at all. 
Equally, many of us are taught that certain fleeting pleasures, such as the 
enjoyment of soda or candy (providing, perhaps, one has already had some such 
pleasures), are really entirely worthless, and so to attach no importance to them 
whatever. 
Moreover, in denying that pleasure is intrinsically good, and pain 
intrinsically bad, I am not denying the considerable importance of pleasure, and 
absence of pain, for a life that is good for its subject. On the contrary, on each of 
theories of lifetime well-being I have sketched, it is unlikely that a given person 
could have a life that is especially good for him if he does not experience a 
significant amount of pleasure and relatively little pain. On desire-based 
theories, this is because, for most of us, while idealisation may remove our 
desire for an extra fleeting pleasure, or our aversion to an extra fleeting pain, it 
will make no difference to our wanting a life that is, considered as a whole, 
pleasurable and relatively painless. (My example of an idealised agent, 
                                               
29 I defend this version of hedonism at length in a separate paper. 
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Lawrence, is not indifferent to the affective quality of his life considered more 
generally.) On achievementism, it is because most of us have it as a goal to lead 
a life that is pleasurable and relatively painless. On perfectionism, it is because 
the capacity for pleasure is part of any adequate account of human nature. 
Finally, on hedonism, it is obvious why it is so. Moreover, it is clear that 
without some pleasures (including, perhaps, quite a large number of fairly trivial 
ones), or with too much pain, it would be virtually impossible for most of us to 
adequately function in our lives, and so achieve anything. Pleasure, and pain 
avoidance, that is, have considerable instrumental value for us. 
I conclude that whole-life welfarism allows us to solve the puzzle. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
In this paper, I have argued for a new theory of value, whole-life welfarism, 
according to which something is good (or bad) only if it increases (or decreases) 
a person’s lifetime well-being in some way. This theory allows us to explain not 
only why death can be a bad thing in virtue of harming its subject (despite its 
not making him worse off at any time), but also why there is no amount of short, 
mild headaches (despite their making us worse off at particular times) that can 
be worse than a premature death. 
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